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Counterinsurgency Field Manual - U. S. Army - 01-01-01

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written in 2006, is a guide for the Army and Marine Corps to all counterinsurgency tactics and operations, designed for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first manual on counterinsurgency in 20 years for the Army and 25 years for the Marine Corps, this 598-page manual outlines how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, including the role of the military in efforts to improve the quality of life for the people of the nation in question.


This manual provides a comprehensive understanding of the history and evolution of American counterinsurgency operations. It includes a detailed examination of the underlying theories, concepts, and doctrine that have guided military operations in the field of counterinsurgency from the end of World War II to the present.

Learning to Forget: The U.S. Army in the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine after the Vietnam War - David Fitzgerald - 2013-06-26

Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine after the Vietnam War. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it points to a way forward for the US military in the counterinsurgency wars that seem certain to continue.

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Paperbound) - U. S. Army - 01-01-01

U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine 1942-1976 (Paperbound) - U. S. Army - 01-01-01

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In the global War on Terror, among the greatest threats to the United States military are insurgent uprisings. Enter the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Warrior Handbook. The U.S. Army has experienced counterinsurgency operations in the War of 1846-1848, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The fundamentals of counterinsurgency are timeless. The nature of the opponent is ever-changing, but the way in which the military reacts to it should not. The principles and operational techniques of counterinsurgency are timeless, but the way they are applied must be dynamic.
Learning, Relearning, and Unlearning, The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1898-1940

Lauren Raouf - 2016-04-25

Bachelor Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, Harvard University, language: English, abstract: The present thesis examines the factors that led to the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, focusing on the period from 1898-1940 and why the two organizations had strikingly different approaches and beliefs about the importance of this doctrine. When the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described war as ‘simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means,’ he was writing primarily with reference to conventional warfare between the nations armies fighting for the achievement of a specific set of political objectives. However, Clausewitz’s understanding of war is equally applicable to a different kind of warfare: revolutionary warfare, defined by John Shy and Thomas Collier as “the seizure of political power by the use of armed force.” In this type of war, the insurgent force attempts to gain political power (usually the power of the state) while the counterinsurgent force—usually the state, although sometimes supported by outside actors—tries to retain its hold on political power. Revolutionary war is at its heart a struggle for the support of the people, an explicitly political kind of warfare. The problems of se.png
Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The report identifies potential initiatives for improving Army doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare. These include recommendations that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute for training officers in counterinsurgency, and (3) conduct counterinsurgency studies. The report identifies potential initiatives for improving Army doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare. These include recommendations that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute for training officers in counterinsurgency, and (3) conduct counterinsurgency studies.

The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency - Steven Metz - 1997

This report identifies potential initiatives for improving Army doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare. These include recommendations that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute for training officers in counterinsurgency, and (3) conduct counterinsurgency studies.

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The way wars are fought has changed starkly over the past sixty years. International military campaigns used to play out between armies at central fronts. Today’s conflicts find major powers facing rebel insurgencies deploying elusive methods, from improvised explosions to terrorist attacks. Presenting a transformative understanding of these contemporary confrontations, Small Wars, Big Data shows that a revolution in the study of conflict yields new insights into terrorism, civil wars, and foreign interventions. Modern warfare is not about struggles over territory but over people; civilians—and the information they might provide—can turn the tide at critical junctures. Drawing lessons from conflicts in locations around the world, Small Wars, Big Data provides groundbreaking perspectives for how small wars can be better strategized and favorably won.

**Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence**

The publication of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations as actually conducted. By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves this proposition. An examination of COIN doctrine and operations in the 1960s reveals that operations seldom matched written doctrine. Instead of winning hearts and minds, improving civil-military relations, conducting small-unit operations, and gathering intelligence, most Vietnam War commanders and units attempted to defeat the insurgency through large-scale operations and overwhelming firepower. Modern U.S. COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a similar preference for high-intensity warfare and a similar inability to adapt technologically and mentally to the requirements of COIN.

To help explain the discrepancy between written doctrine and actual operations, this paper posits that ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. While embedded beliefs can help organizations as they conduct their preferred missions, they can be detrimental in other contexts. Mental and material preparation for high-intensity warfare has made the U.S. military poorly suited to COIN. Altering these beliefs will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education. The services must reorient themselves mentally as well as physically.

**US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam**

This volume examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Christopher K. Ives shows how before the Second Indochina War, the Republic of Vietnam had begun to falter under the burden of an increasingly successful insurgency. The dominant American military culture could not conform to President Kennedy’s guidance to wage “small wars,” while President Duren’s provincial and military structures provided neither assistance nor security. The Green Berets developed and executed effective counterinsurgency tactics and operations with strategic implications while living, training, and finally fighting with the Montagnard peoples in the Central Highlands. Special Forces soldiers developed and executed what needed to be done to mobilize indigenous minorities, having assessed what needed to be known. Combining Clausewitz, business theory and strategic insight, this book provides an important starting point for thinking about how the US military should be approaching the problems of today’s “small wars.” US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam will be of much interest to students of the Vietnam War, Special Forces operations, military innovation and strategic theory in general.

**Small Wars, Big Data**

How a new understanding of warfare can help the military fight today’s conflicts more effectively The way wars are fought has changed starkly over the past sixty years. International military campaigns used to play out between armies at central fronts. Today’s conflicts find major powers facing rebel insurgencies deploying elusive methods, from improvised explosives to terrorist attacks. Presenting a transformative understanding of these contemporary confrontations, Small Wars, Big Data shows that a revolution in the study of conflict yields new insights into terrorism, civil wars, and foreign interventions. Modern warfare is not about struggles over territory but over people; civilians—and the information they might provide—can turn the tide at critical junctures. Drawing lessons from conflicts in locations around the world, Small Wars, Big Data provides groundbreaking perspectives for how small wars can be better strategized and favorably won.

**Control Chapter 21. Camouflage Personal Camouflage Methods of Stalking Chapter 22. Contact With People Contact With Local People The Survivor’s Behavior**

**Means for Signaling Codes and Signals Aircraft Vectoring Procedures Chapter 20. Survival Movement in Hostile Areas Phases of Planning Execution Return to Friendly**

**Signaling Techniques Application**

**Cordage Rucksack Construction Clothing and Insulation Cooking and Eating Utensils Chapter 13. Desert Survival Terrain Environmental Factors Need for Water Heat**

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